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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Michael Comstock 
 
The uncertain future of Vladimir Rushailo 
In the turbulent world of Russian politics, few are subject to as much speculation 
or bear as much legend as the current secretary of the Security Council, Vladimir 
Rushailo. He began his career in the perestroika-era Moscow Office of 
Investigations at the age of 24, and continued in the Ministry of the Interior 
(MVD). Rushailo rose to prominence fighting organized crime in the chaotic 
backwash that was created with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Russia's 
attempt to create a free market economy. He developed and led his own 
specialized unit within the MVD, the Regional Directorate for Combating 
Organized Crime (RUBOP), a unit whose reputation supposedly struck fear into 
the hearts of criminal syndicates. In a 1996 dispute with the MVD's leadership, 
Rushailo was ousted from his directorate, but later returned in triumph to head 
the MVD itself. His connection to oligarch-in-exile Boris Berezovsky, begun in 
1998, is credited with providing Rushailo with the political capital necessary to 
head the MVD for two straight years (1999-2001) despite government changes. 
Indeed, cooperation between the two is suspected in a high-profile release of 
hostages in Chechnya. Moreover, Alexander Litvinenko, the FSB agent who 
defected to the West and works closely with Berezovsky, devotes several 
chapters of his book Assassinating Russia to sing the praises of the anti-
organized crime unit of the MVD. According to Litvinenko, the MVD unit was 
actively investigating FSB complicity in crime and terrorism, including bombings 
in Moscow in 1994 and 1996. (Yuri Feltshinsky and Alexander Litvinenko, 
Blowing Up Russia, New York, 2002) Others claim that RUBOP and its city 
division, GUBOP, were themselves active criminal syndicates that competed 
against the FSB for turf. (EURASIANET, 1 Feb 02) 
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Over a year ago Rushailo resigned from the MVD in a mass power ministry 
departure. Shortly thereafter he was appointed by President Vladimir Putin to 
become the new Secretary of the Security Council while his predecessor, Sergei 
Ivanov, was appointed Minister of Defense. (REN TV, 1015 GMT, 3 Mar 02; via 
ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
This nominal promotion may have terminated Rushailo's career. This is indicated 
by four considerations: First, Rushailo is visibly connected to Berezovsky, a vocal 
critic of Putin's presidency; second, Sergei Ivanov is a member of the ubiquitous 
St. Petersburg group and has been referred to not only as a potential vice 
president, but a vice-Putin; third, the Security Council itself is an institution that 
"can be everything or nothing," a real center of power that in theory can rival that 
of the presidency or an official institution that is little more than a bureaucratic 
shell left behind once the real power has moved on; fourth, after Rushailo left, the 
MVD was reorganized and in effect made subordinate to and dependent on the 
FSB. (IZVESTIA, 28 Mar 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0329; via World News Connection) 
 
In Putin's Kremlin it is accepted that the Yel'tsin-era appointees and members of 
the so-called Russian Oligarchy are on the way out, while the members of the St. 
Petersburg group are on the rise. Putin's logic in moving his collaborator in 
power, Sergei Ivanov, into the defense ministry and Rushailo into the Security 
Council is fairly simple. The influence of the Security Council relates to the ability 
of its chief to interact with Putin. Ivanov's power followed him to the defense 
ministry, while Rushailo's was tied to the MVD, which had been downgraded. 
Ivanov has been able to continue exerting a good deal of influence on Russian 
foreign policy and other matters of national security, while Rushailo gained only 
the empty shell. For Putin this transfer was ideal, for it prevented Ivanov from 
amassing too much real power (over the whole array of security services) in the 
Security Council, at the same time using this FSB man to keep a watch over the 
military. Additionally, it increased Putin's control over the military at a critical time 
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and ensured that a potential rival, Rushailo, would not be fired in a blatantly 
political fashion; he was, after all, promoted. The end result was a net gain in 
Putin's own already tremendous power base. 
 
In his first interview as the Security Council's head, Rushailo stated, 
"[C]ountering internal threats undoubtedly takes priority. The state's internal life 
requires continual attention and monitoring. Among the most serious threats I 
would include illegal trafficking in narcotics.... One other threat that is topical both 
for Russia and for the entire world community is international terrorism." 
(IZVESTIYA, 21 Jul 01; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Rushailo has made 
public announcements regarding this agenda throughout the year. He visited 
Central Asia following 11 September, and has attended all the necessary 
meetings with President Putin. However, he does not seem to be a driving factor 
behind Putin's administration.  
 
To add insult to injury, Rushailo's RUBOP was dissolved summarily by his 
successor at the MVD, Boris Gryzlov, in a sweeping administrative reform. 
(KOMMERSANT, 22 Jun 01; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Recently, a 
document has surfaced in the MVD's Internal Security Directorate tying Rushailo 
to abuse of funds during his tenure at the RUBOP. The document's title leaves 
little to the imagination: "On abuse of power by former leaders of the Moscow 
Regional Directorate for Combating Organized Crime in the use of funds of the 
Assistance to Social Protection of High Risk Professional Groups charity fund." 
(VERSIYA, No. 14, 8-14 Apr 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) And most 
recently the General Prosecutor's Office (GPO) has amassed the power to 
coordinate Russia's various law enforcement agencies, taking even that hardly 
substantive role away from the secretary of the Security Council. 
(NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 12 Feb 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
In short, Rushailo has become increasingly sidelined, the political equivalent of a 
bench-warmer. His powers effectively have been stripped and there is the matter 
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of a legal ax over his head. This is not something to be taken lightly given Putin's 
proclivity to using the prosecutor as a political weapon by enforcing laws 
selectively against those who challenge him. Excepting a radical reversal of 
fortune, Rushailo probably will continue to occupy his position until it serves 
Putin's purpose to remove him.  
 
GOVERNMENT 
Recent developments in the executive 
President Putin has vocally criticized the economic plan put forward by the 
cabinet, and has demanded that the "government must draw up more ambitious 
plans." This criticism came shortly before his annual address to the Federal 
Assembly, a much-anticipated event. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 10 Apr 02; 
FBIS-SOV-2002-0410, via World News Connection) Putin must be coming to the 
realization that even his popularity eventually has to be backed up by substantial 
economic progress. 
 
Putin hinted that a reorganization within the Kremlin is in the works: "The system 
(of government and administration) was formed in the past. It is functioning, more 
or less exists, but is increasingly at variance with the realities." (ITAR-TASS, 7 
Apr 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0407, via World News Connection) What this means 
specifically was not elucidated, but it is probably a ploy used to frighten those on 
the periphery of Putin's circle into a greater degree of sycophancy and 
submission. It merely signals that Putin will continue to maneuver in ways likely 
to increase his own power. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
 
Spies everywhere: FSB sting allegedly exposes CIA espionage 
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Last Wednesday, an FSB officer appeared anonymously on state television to 
claim that the agency had foiled a major CIA espionage plot. According to the 
officer, the CIA operation was focused both on stealing Russian military secrets 
and on gaining information about the security relationship between Russia and 
the former Soviet states. (THE GUARDIAN, 11 Apr 02) 
 
Specifically, the FSB alleges that the CIA was trying to obtain details of the 
Shkval rocket-propelled torpedo, which may be able to reach speeds four times 
as fast as those currently in service. (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 11 Apr 02; 
via ISI Emerging Markets Database) This is the same program that allegedly was 
penetrated by former US Navy officer Edmond Pope, who was convicted of 
espionage in December 2000 before receiving a presidential pardon, and Anatoly 
Babkin, who is awaiting trial on charges of treason.  
 
According to the FSB allegation, two CIA agents, David Robertson and Jungie 
Kesinger, posing as US diplomats, made contact with a lieutenant colonel who 
worked at the Russian naval weapons testing center at Issyk-Kul Lake in 
Kyrgyzstan. (KOMMERSANT DAILY, 11 Apr 02; WPS Russian Political Monitor, 
via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
As yet, the identity of the lieutenant colonel has not been revealed. The story 
takes a strange twist, in that the FSB alleges that the officer did not give up 
information voluntarily, but rather, that Robertson and Kesinger spiked food and 
drink with psychotropic (mind-bending) drugs in order to extract information. 
 
 Supposedly uncovered by the FSB, the officer, now code-named "Viktor," 
became a double agent, and maintained contact with the CIA operatives. 
According to the FSB spokesman, the CIA, using a variety of dead-drops, "Sent 
him letters with secret writing which indicated his assignments and contained a 
certain sum of money." (THE GUARDIAN, 12 Apr 02) Allegedly, the sum 
received amounted to approximately $10,000, and he was to provide data on a 
 6 
variety of subjects, including the torpedo and Russia's new air-to-air and air-to-
surface missiles. (THE ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, 12 Apr 02; via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) According to the FSB spokesman, once enough evidence 
had been gathered, the agency moved to shut down the operation, preventing 
serious damage to Russia's national security. (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 10 
Apr 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Kesinger could not be prosecuted because she holds diplomatic immunity, but 
reportedly she has been forced to leave Russia due to the allegations. 
Robertson, the FSB claims, currently is in Kyrgyzstan, where he is working 
alongside US forces in the "war on terrorism," and thus is safe from prosecution. 
(THE INDEPENDENT, 12 Apr 02) 
 
It is difficult to know what implications these allegations may have on US-Russian 
relations, especially since Presidents Bush and Putin are due to hold a series of 
meetings in Moscow and St. Petersburg in less than six weeks. Both the US 
State Department and the CIA's spokesman at the Moscow embassy, Mark 
Mansfield, have declined to comment on the claims, while senior Russian 
officials have been at pains to insist that the episode has "absolutely nothing to 
do with the upcoming summit." (ITAR-TASS, 10 Apr 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Such statements, however, should not necessarily be taken at face value, 
especially in the wake of last month's meeting of intelligence officers in St. 
Petersburg. The allegations may be intended to create the perception that Putin's 
downplaying of friction with the West is unpopular among the security services, 
and that President Bush, therefore, must offer Putin larger rewards for 
cooperation with the United States. (Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 11 Apr 
02) 
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Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Luba Schwartzman 
 
REGIONS 
The less things change 
Gubernatorial elections were held in the Lipetsk and the Pensk oblasts. 
Incumbents were victorious in both. Lipetsk Oblast' Governor Oleg Korolev 
received 73.04 percent while his closest rival, Lipetsk City Deputy Mayor Igor 
Polosin, obtained only 5 percent. The race in the Pensk Oblast' was close: 
Governor Vasily Bochkarev garnered 45.45 percent while his challenger, State 
Duma Deputy (Communist) Viktor Iliukhin, received 40.96 percent. (RIA, 0401 
GMT, 15 Apr 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets, and ORT, 15 Apr 
02; via www.ortv.ru) 
 
The more they stay the same 
The Central Electoral Commission, which found no serious infractions in the 
conduct of the oblast' elections, has approved them. The situation is very 
different, however, in the Republic of Ingushetia, where an investigation has 
been initiated into large-scale vote-buying in last Sunday's first round of 
presidential elections. Pressure on the local electoral commission by the central 
and republic's governments is suspected. 
 
Originally, there were 23 candidates in the first round of the elections, many 
running by virtue of the political trends they represent more than on individual 
merit. But only eight candidates finally appeared on the ballot. (One was 
disqualified and 14 stood down. Of those 14, 6 threw their support to ex-MVD 
Minister Khamzat Gutseriev.) The three main candidates were: Deputy 
Presidential Plenipotentiary to the Southern Federal District and Federal Security 
Service (FSB) General Murat Zyazikov, representing the Kremlin and promising 
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to stabilize the situation in the region and keep it in line with the center's political 
line; Akhmet Malsagov, the current acting president of Ingushetia; and former 
interior minister of Ingushetia Khamzat Gutseriev. Gutseriev has the support of 
outgoing President Aushev, who nominated him for the presidency. 
 
According to informed observers, "ousting Gutseriev was the most decisive move 
the Kremlin has made in regional elections." The Kremlin sought to install its own 
FSB man in Ingushetia because it is otherwise impossible to cloak in secrecy the 
outrages of the war in Chechnya and the dismal condition of the refugees. 
(MOSCOW TIMES, 8 Apr 02) 
 
Gutseriev was registered as a candidate on 9 February, but didn't formally resign 
his MVD minister position until 7 March. This was brought up as a campaign 
irregularity in the Ingush Supreme Court. Moscow, however, grew impatient and 
preempted the local court. The Russian Supreme Court decided the matter in a 
speedy and efficient manner - and disqualified Gutseriev. 
 
The other two candidates made it through the first round of the elections, but did 
rather poorly: Zyazikov (the FSB candidate) received 19.4 percent and Malsagov 
17.3 percent. The voters apparently could see through Kremlin intrigues -- and 
gave State Duma Deputy (United Russia) Alikhan Amirkhanov 31.5 percent. The 
second round will be held on 28 April. (ITAR-TASS, 0151 GMT, 8 Apr 02; FBIS-
SOV-2002-0408, via World News Connection) 
 
MEDIA 
Even new languages... 
Despite protests by Russian State Duma deputies and pro-Kremlin Chechen 
authorities, Radio Liberty promises to continue daily broadcasts on political, 
economic, cultural and ethnic issues in Russian, Chechen, Cherkess and Avar. 
(ITAR-TASS, 1325 GMT, 1 Apr 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0401, via World News 
Connection) The segments in Avar, Chechen and Cherkess are being produced 
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by the bureau in Prague and broadcast over short-wave, whereas the Russian 
service is produced in Moscow and broadcast on local channels. 
 
Presidential Aide Sergey Yastrzhembsky announced that Kremlin experts will 
monitor the programs and "respond in the framework of Russian legislation." He 
noted that "the North Caucasus is a very sensitive region for Russia and 
Chechnya is a painful point." (INTERFAX, 1643 GMT, 30 Mar 02; FBIS-SOV-
2002-0330, via World News Connection) 
 
The Committee for International Affairs of the State Duma is working on a 
proposal to recall the Radio Liberty license for these broadcasts. The 
committee's deputy chair, Sergey Shishkarev, asserted that "broadcasts to the 
territory in which the antiterrorist operation is being conducted can be regarded 
as interference in our internal affairs." Moreover, "in view of the recent resolution 
of the US Congress on Chechnya," in which actions of the federal authorities 
were "unceremoniously criticized," it can be "surmised that information neutrality 
will not be observed in Radio Liberty broadcasts." (ITAR-TASS, 1209 GMT, 4 Apr 
02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0404, via World News Connection) 
 
...Should follow the old rules 
Around the same time, Russian President Vladimir Putin also focused on media 
freedom. In an interview with Russian and German journalists in anticipation of 
his visit to a forum in Weimar, he declared: "If freedom of the press is understood 
as the freedom of some so-called oligarchs to buy journalists and impose their 
will on them in their group interests and advocate this road of oligarchic 
development, which has been inflicted on Russia during the last decade, if 
freedom of the press is understood this way, yes, it is in danger. If freedom of the 
press is understood as the ability of journalists and media teams to openly, freely 
and fearlessly express their viewpoints on key problems of development of the 
country and nation, to criticize the actions of authorities, to expect a 
corresponding response from the authorities, I am absolutely sure that such a 
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state of affairs will be achieved in Russia." (INTERFAX, 1421 GMT, 7 Apr 02; 
FBIS-SOV-2002-0407, via World News Connection) 
 
FEDERAL ASSEMBLY 
What's better than a Communist Party? 
On 3 April, State Duma deputies voted on the redistribution of committee chairs. 
The Communists lost seven of the nine seats and, along with the Agrarians, 
renounced the other two in protest. Three of the lost seats went to the 
Fatherland-All Russia bloc, two went to the Union of Right Forces and one each 
went to YABLOKO and Regions of Russia. The centrists charged that, for two 
years, the Communists and Agrarians delayed reforms in legislation. They expect 
the State Duma to become more efficient with the change in leadership. (ORT, 3 
Apr 02; via www.ortv.ru) 
 
In response, the Communists and the Agrarians gave up their remaining posts, a 
move that was criticized by Chairman of the Russian State Duma (Communist) 
Gennady Seleznev. (ITAR-TASS, 1019 GMT, 11 Apr 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0411, 
via World News Connection) 
 
Seleznev himself is at the center of a bigger controversy. After he was deprived 
of his casting vote (used to break parliamentary ties), there were rumors that 
Kremlin-faithful elements in the Duma would press on to oust him from his seat. 
Instead, the head of the staff of the State Duma, Leonid Troshkin, has resigned, 
asserting that he "could no longer carry out his duties in light of the complicated 
situation that had arisen around him," and that "for the sake of ensuring the 
stable and calm functioning of the administration," he was asking to be relieved 
of his duties. (INTERFAX, 1309 GMT, 6 Apr 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0406, via World 
News Connection)  
 
Two communist parties! 
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The pressure against Seleznev is coming largely from members of his own party. 
On 10 April, the plenum of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation 
(CPRF) Central Committee voted 74 to 16 in favor of advising Seleznev to leave 
the position. (ITAR-TASS, 0925 GMT, 11 Apr 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0411, via 
World News Connection) Although Party Chairman Gennady Zyuganov denies 
this, Vassily Ponomarev, the head of the ideology department at the CPRF 
Moscow branch, even said that Seleznev may be expelled from the Communist 
Party for his lack of solidarity. (ITAR-TASS, 1832 GMT, 11 Apr 02; FBIS-SOV-
2002-0411, via World News Connection) 
 
Since Seleznev has his own political movement, Rossiya, it is likely that if the rift 
between him and Zyuganov widens, it will be accompanied by a split within the 
Communist Party. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 9 Apr 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0409, 
via World News Connection) 
 
Such a split would be good for the president, who has expressed the sentiment 
that Seleznev should stay at his post since his departure would challenge the 
voter-expressed support for the Communists (according to a public opinion poll, 
34 percent of voters support the Communists, while only 21 percent support 
United Russia). (INTERFAX, 1125 GMT, 1 Apr 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0401, and 
INTERFAX, 1830 GMT, 4 Apr 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0404, via World News 
Connection) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Scott Bethel 
 
Russia still attempting to play a role in the Middle East 
Though Russian foreign policy moves currently are not in the headlines, Moscow 
is still making every effort to be a player in the Middle East as well as in the 
question of Iraq. Russian foreign ministry officials are trying to support the 
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Palestinian position despite the continued Palestinian use of terror as a principal 
weapon. 
 
The Russians have been among the more vocal defenders of Iraq and the 
Palestinian Authority. In terms of the totality of the problems in the Middle East, 
the Russians are pressing for more international activity under the auspices of 
the UN. At the same time, the Russians continue to provide materiel and 
encouragement for the Iraqi government. The same holds true for the Palestinian 
Authority and its leader. Thus, Iraq and the Palestinian Authority can use Russia 
as a lever against the US and Israel. 
 
Palestinian pals 
Russia's lead spokesman is Andrey Vdovin, Moscow's special envoy to the 
Middle East, although Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov provides regular input; both 
have made similar appeals to the world community. "We demand the adherence 
of all parties to existing UN resolutions 1397 and 1402 and additional, 
enforceable resolutions to stop the violence," Ivanov said. (ITAR-TASS, 1735 
GMT, 4 Apr 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Bowing to the Russian desire to play an increased role, the US has included the 
Russian envoy in the mediation talks. Vdovin has attended daily meetings with 
the so-called "quartet of mediators" -- the United States, Russia, the European 
Union and the United Nations. (ITAR-TASS, 1816 GMT, 2 Apr 02; BBC 
Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) The Russian envoy claims to be 
frustrated with the lack of progress and said, "the situation in the 'occupied 
territories' is extremely grave and there is little hope for improvement in the near 
term." (ITAR-TASS, 1620 GMT, 2 Apr 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) He said there was not enough pressure coming from either 
the UN or the US to force the Israelis to comply with UN resolution 1402, which 
actually calls for an immediate cessation of violence as well as the withdrawal of 
Israeli forces. (ITAR-TASS, 1620 GMT, 2 Apr 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI 
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Emerging Markets Database) As a result he left the region in protest on 4 April 
for three days. (RIA, 2004 GMT, 5 Apr 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) 
 
The Russians continue their support for Yassir Arafat as a putative participant in 
negotiations. "We find it most desirable that Yassir Arafat, whom we believe to be 
the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, be given the opportunity 
to act as the head of the Palestinian National Authority," Ivanov said. Arafat has 
visited every Soviet and Russian leader since Brezhnev and has signed all 
Palestinian agreements of cooperation with Russia. (ITAR-TASS, 1735 GMT, 4 
Apr 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
The Russians are faced with a perception problem in the current Middle East 
crisis. They have long favored the Palestinian side in this equation (see THE NIS 
OBSERVED, 3 Apr 02), yet cannot escape two critical factors. First, the 
Palestinian Authority, and specifically, Yassir Arafat, refuse to make any 
meaningful efforts to curb the suicide bombers. (THE NEW YORK TIMES, 6 Apr 
02) Second, Arafat repeatedly has been offered very favorable conditions, 
including a significant amount of land to establish a Palestinian state (as well as 
some very attractive offers of long-term economic development from the US and 
the EU). (US NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 25 Mar 02) It is increasingly difficult 
to continue staunch support for the PLO under these circumstances; it is possible 
that Moscow will adopt a more pragmatic approach and, if the crisis escalates, 
may back away and allow the Palestinian Authority to take the consequences of 
its actions. 
 
Protectors of Iraq 
Moscow is clearer in its policy concerning Iraq. Russia is Saddam Hussein's 
staunchest backer and appears headed for an even deeper commitment. A 
series of meetings held in Baghdad between representatives of the energy sector 
from both countries yielded several key areas of increased cooperation. These 
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included the construction of additional power generator facilities in Iraq by 
Russian firms as well as increased linkage in oil production. (RIA, 1201 GMT, 2 
Apr 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Further, the 
Russians have committed to long-term economic interaction in the "tens of 
billions of dollars." 
 
Meanwhile, Moscow continues to lobby for Iraq. Another high-level economic 
delegation to Baghdad (led by Yuri Shafranik) noted that the UN sanctions 
against Iraq were "not working or are completely ineffective." (ITAR-TASS, 1630 
GMT, 2 Apr 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) The 
Russians have long opposed the sanctions and have sought a relaxation of the 
restrictions on the Iraqi economy. The current Russian effort is to limit any US-
sponsored expansion of the quantities and types of products on the UN restricted 
list. (RIA, 1944 GMT, 2 Apr 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) The delegation pledged "full opposition" from the Russian government 
to the sanctions and confirmed Russia's belief that lifting the sanctions entirely 
was the best approach. (ITAR-TASS, 1804 GMT, 2 Apr 02; BBC Monitoring, via 
ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
The issue of sanctions makes for strange twists. The Iraqis have circumvented 
successfully the entire sanctions process for more than 10 years. Their oil 
production is at the same level it was in 1990 (before Desert Storm) while the 
amount of raw crude processed and exported actually has increased. (THE NEW 
YORK TIMES, 4 Mar 02) European countries regularly have bought Iraqi oil and 
neighboring countries have mixed Iraqi oil with their own in an effort to disguise 
its source. However, the income derived from these exports has not translated 
into a healthy Iraqi economy; the per capita income of the average Iraqi 
plummeted from $3,104 in 1984 to $1,501 in 1999. (UN COUNTRY REPORT, 
1999) Still, Iraqi leaders live lavishly and Saddam Hussein offers the family of 
each Palestinian suicide bomber $25,000. Russia also continues to supply the 
Iraqi regime with significant military hardware. Moscow just completed a deal to 
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sell trucks and passenger vehicles to Baghdad. (ITAR-TASS, 0402 GMT, 12 Apr 
02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets Database) Iraq does not pay cash 
for purchases from the Russians, so there is a vested interest in Moscow to limit 
the sanctions. 
 
Now, it seems, Baghdad wants to form "an international coalition headed by 
Russia to prevent US aggression against Iraq," according to Iraqi Deputy Prime 
Minister Tariq Aziz. (ITAR-TASS, 0900 GMT, 7 Apr 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) Aziz made this proposal during a roundtable 
meeting celebrating the 30th anniversary of the friendship and cooperation treaty 
between the two countries. His goal is to form a strong enough block to oppose 
any proposals to "increase sanctions or conduct attacks against Iraq." (ITAR-
TASS, 0900 GMT, 6 Apr 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database)  
 
There was no immediate response from the Russian side. However, it is very 
unlikely that Moscow would enter into a formal agreement, especially one 
obligating Russia to take military action in support of Iraq. First, the Russians 
have extremely limited power projection capabilities. In fact, Russia is greatly 
reducing its overseas presence by closing facilities in Cuba and Viet Nam. 
Second, Russia is not equipped to conduct operations in Iraq or any other desert 
environment -- its hardware has proven time and again to be unsuited for hot 
dusty climates. In addition the Iraqis, though close allies of the Russians, are not 
predictable and may commit themselves to more than Moscow could support. 
The Russians simply will continue to oppose sanctions in the diplomatic sphere 
only. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces and Military-
Industrial Complex 
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By Walter Jackson 
 
ARMED FORCES 
Spring exercises 
Spring is that time of the year when armed forces begin to flex their muscles, 
conducting both national and joint military maneuvers. One such exercise, titled 
"South Antiterror 2002," will be conducted in mid-April under the auspices of the 
Collective Security Treaty (CST). The joint forces of Russia, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan will form the Collective Rapid Deployment Forces of the Central Asian 
region, and will combat a simulated enemy from the south (Georgia). Although 
open to all members of the CIS, only Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan expressed an 
interest in the exercise -- signifying the total collapse of the military component of 
the CST, according to some analysts, as many Central Asian countries re-orient 
their militaries away from Russia and toward the US and its West European 
allies. (NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA, 8 Apr 02; What the Papers Say, via ISI 
Defense and Security Database) 
 
Kaliningrad on the front line 
The Baltic Fleet conducted a large-scale air-defense exercise under the watchful 
eyes of Northern, Pacific and Black Sea fleet commanders and the Caspian Sea 
Flotilla commander. The exercise featured a new automated command-and-
control air defense system created by the Moscow Research Institute of 
Automatics and tested the Baltic Fleet's air defenses and anti-ballistic missile 
defense systems. The Baltic Fleet was the test-bed for fielding this new system; 
the exercise was completed following the recent NATO exercise Strong Resolve 
2002, which simulated a NATO landing force of peacekeepers. 
 
During the exercise, 170 different types of interceptors were used, including two 
S-200V missiles (the same type that mistakenly downed the TU-154 airliner over 
the Black Sea). To some observers the exercise resembled some episodes of 
past Balkan air strikes. With flight time from the nearest NATO airfields to vital 
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Kaliningrad facilities just under one minute, response time is critical, as is a fully 
automated air-defense system. The test was touted as a success, but it is 
uncertain whether the navy can afford to purchase this system for all fleets. 
(ROSSIISKIE VESTI, 8 Apr 02; What the Papers Say, via ISI Defense and 
Security Database) Although publicly NATO is no longer considered an enemy, 
this show of force perhaps demonstrates to the Russians their ability to fend for 
themselves, especially in light of NATO's likely expansion into the Baltic region.  
 
New aircraft for the Black Sea Fleet 
The Russian Navy's Main Staff of Aviation recently reported that the Black Sea 
Fleet may receive a new aircraft carrier variant of the SU-27 KUB fighter aircraft 
and attack helicopters as part of a 2004-2005 modernization program. The Baltic 
Fleet currently has aircraft carrier flight simulators to teach pilots the intricacies of 
such aviation. These simulators soon may be used in the Black Sea Fleet. 
(ROSBLAT INFORMATION AGENCY, 10 Apr 02; What the Papers Say, via ISI 
Defense and Security Database) Carrier aviation is expensive, highly complex, 
and one area in which the Russian Navy never really excelled. With fierce 
competition for scarce defense budget dollars, the Russian Navy is ill advised to 
pursue these programs with many more critical programs to fund just to keep 
itself afloat. 
 
A Russian albatross 
Although details of his visit were kept secret, Russia's top Admiral Vladimir 
Kuroedov's visit to the Black Sea port of Taganrog early in April was to sign an 
agreement to procure an undisclosed number of A-40 Albatross seaplanes. 
Although nearly 20 years old, this large (86-ton) jet aircraft is capable of speeds 
up to 700 kph, can carry 70 passengers up to 6,600 kilometers and can land in 
rough sea conditions. Large seaplanes like the Albatross are used predominately 
for sea search and rescue by countries such as Japan and Canada; however, 
some Russian experts claim the Albatross is an excellent anti-submarine warfare 
platform since it can land at sea. They also state that the US lags behind Russia 
 18 
in production of jet seaplanes, citing several failed attempts by the US. 
(KOMMERSANT, 10 Apr 02; What the Papers Say, via ISI Defense and Security 
Database) Only time will tell whether the Albatross will resemble its long-lived 
namesake or Coleridge's literary example of the immovable burden -- more 
precisely, one more funding yoke to hold down the Russian Navy's modernization 
efforts. 
 
The US will need its shield 
Andrey Nikolaev, the head of the Russian Duma Defense Committee, recently 
warned that the US plan to pull out of the 1972 ABM Treaty will result in another 
arms race. Americans want "to shield the territory of the United States with an 
antimissile umbrella, and make it invulnerable in the event of radical cuts in 
nuclear arms," Nikolaev said. In response to the US policy, "We should increase 
the threat in turn If you build up the shield, we will build up the sword," he 
suggested. (INTERFAX, 1134 GMT, 18 Mar 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0318, via World 
News Connection) Although clearly a lot of bravado, this type of rhetoric in the 
Duma, ironically, is part of the US motivation behind building up the shield. 
 
MILITARY INDUSTRIAL-COMPLEX 
Supply and demand 
According to the director-general of Rosoboroneksport, Andrei Belyaminov, 
contracts delivering Su-family fighters to India and China accounted for half of 
the company's 2001 sales, totaling $4.2 billion. By 2008, as these existing 
contracts are completed, new demands for expanding and modernizing air 
defense systems and purchasing new naval ships likely will fill the gap. 
(IZVESTIA, 8 Apr 02; What the Papers Say, via ISI Defense and Security 
Database) 
 
As the leading Russian defense industry, Rosoboroneksport is capitalizing on the 
current political turmoil, seeking to increase demand for Russian-made aircraft, 
ships and air defense systems. However, improving the air defense capabilities 
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of countries labeled by the US as harboring terrorists (such as Iran and Iraq), 
although profitable to Russia, will only promote regional instability. The presumed 
invincibility provided by Russian air defense systems actually may encourage 
more militant behavior. 
 
Chinese destroyers 
The winner of the $1.4 billion contract to build destroyers for China is Severnaya 
Verf Shipyard, according to documents signed by Director-General of the 
Russian Shipbuilding Agency Vladimir Posnelov. Final signatures of the Chinese 
and Russian governments are expected soon. The contract is retroactive to 
January, with ships commissioning required by 2006, so the timeline is relatively 
short. (DELOVOY PETERSBURG, 8 Apr 02; What the Papers Say, via ISI 
Defense and Security Database) This is a boon to the Russian shipbuilding 
industry, although it is unclear how much spillover will result in new construction 
for the aging Russian Navy. 
 
21st century corvettes 
The St. Petersburg-based Central Maritime Design Bureau Almaz has long been 
the designer of naval ships. Almaz designed Russia's first generation corvettes, 
the Tarantul and Nanuchka classes, and the older Komar and Osa classes. 
Working on the premise that multipurpose corvettes and frigates will account for 
the major part of surface ships to be built in the 21st century, Almaz is developing 
an entire series of next generation ships. The new projects of the bureau include 
the DK500 light corvette and the heavier DK1000 and DK1900 series. The 
corvettes combine modern propulsion engineering technology with stealth to 
maximize speed, increase endurance and reduce detection: They will feature 
modular interchangeable weapons systems with multipurpose anti-ship, air 
defense and antisubmarine missiles launchers; a 100-mm gun; multi-purpose 
helicopter; and a state-of-the-art C3 control center. (MILITARY PARADE NO. 6, 
10 Apr 02; What the Papers Say, via ISI Defense and Security Database) 
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The DK series corvette is not only the right replacement to Russia's aging fleet, 
but also a future staple (with modifications) for export as well. 
 
Indian submarine exports 
The Russian defense industry seeks to capture a portion of the 24 new 
submarines India plans to purchase by 2030. The director of Russia's 
shipbuilding company Admiralteiskie Verfi, Vladimir Alexandrov, reported that 
successful negotiations with the Indian Navy were held last year to build six 
Amur-class diesel submarines. The actual contract could be signed this fall. 
Although France reportedly also is close to signing a contract with India for six 
submarines, this apparently doesn't diminish the prospects for Russia given 
India's total requirements. The first two Amur submarines have been under 
construction for several years. One (named the St. Petersburg) is being built for 
the Russian Navy and one for export (to help pay for the navy's submarine). 
Russia plans to commission the St. Petersburg by the spring of 2003 to celebrate 
the 300th anniversary of its namesake city. India is insistent that the first 
submarine must be completed within 18 to 24 months, and the second Amur-
class submarine likely can meet that requirement. This 10-year project would 
bring in close to $2 billion in sales for the Russian defense industry. 
(VEDOMOSTI, 10 Apr 02; What the Papers Say, via ISI Defense and Security 
Database) 
 
The prospects for shipbuilding look good, and this should benefit the Russian 
Navy as well. Modern technology combining the traits cited in the corvettes and 
the stealthy diesel technology of the diesel submarines definitely meet the 
demands of foreign navies throughout the world. This can only improve the 
Russian shipbuilding base and, more importantly, the likelihood of future Russian 
Navy acquisitions. 
 
3rd PlaceGreece 
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According to Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov, Greece is the third largest 
importer of Russian arms after China and India. After meeting with his Greek 
counterpart, Yiannos Papandoniou in Athens, Ivanov stated that the two had 
signed a plan promoting Russian-Greek military-technical cooperation for 2002. 
Over the past 2 1/2 years, Greek imports of Russian arms have exceeded $1 
billion. Russia anticipates Greek promotion of Russian defense industry exports 
to EU countries once Greece takes over the EU chair for the second half of the 
year. (ITAR-TASS, 5 Apr 02; via RFE/RL Newsline) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
To Iraq with love? 
Just when it may have seemed that President Leonid Kuchma had heard the last 
from unauthorized biographer Mykola Melnychenko, the former presidential 
bodyguard who taped the private conversations of his boss is back. On 12 April, 
Melnychenko reportedly told a US federal grand jury that his recordings contain 
conversations about at least one illegal arms deal with Iraq. Although grand jury 
proceedings generally are secret, Melnychenko discussed his testimony on a 
German radio program. Kuchma, he said, is heard on the tapes discussing the 
delivery of a "Kolchuga" radar system -- designed to detect "stealth" aircraft -- to 
Iraq. Melnychenko also said that a CIA representative at the same hearing 
confirmed the existence of a Kolchuga system in Iraq. 
 
This is an issue that has been percolating for some time; officials have long 
wondered behind closed doors about the nature of the Ukrainian-Iraqi 
relationship. In fact, a UN weapons inspector in 1998 told the Financial Times 
that he and his colleagues had located information suggesting illegal arms 
shipments to Iraq by Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. But until this year, the issue 
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has remained largely speculation and out of public view. These recordings have 
the potential to change that. More importantly, they have the potential to create 
much more of an international problem for Ukraine than Melnychenko's other 
recordings regarding Kuchma's alleged complicity in the murder of journalist 
Georgiy Gongadze. 
 
Melnychenko's testimony supports the earlier statements of parliamentary deputy 
Oleksandr Zhyr, who announced the existence of such a recording in Kyiv on 13 
March. At the time, Zhyr was chair of the commission investigating Kuchma's 
possible involvement in the Gongadze affair. He soon became interested in other 
conversations on the tapes, however. "The commission," he said, "has tapes that 
have to do with arms exports to Iraq worth $100 million in violation of 
international resolutions banning arms exports to that country. President Kuchma 
personally approved these exports." (INTERFAX, 14 Mar 02; via lexis-nexis) 
Zhyr's attempts to have the matter discussed publicly in parliament, however, 
were rebuffed by a slim majority of his colleagues. Still, he gave several press 
conferences and clearly irritated Kuchma with his questions. 
 
The president reacted venomously to Zhyr's charges. He called the accusations 
part of a "propagandistic campaign" that should be "flushed like filth into the 
sewer," and contemptuously dismissed suggestions that the Kolchuga system 
had been used to help shoot down a US plane. (FINANCIAL TIMES, 28 Mar 02; 
via lexis-nexis) He and his allies also organized a major campaign during the 
recent election to divest Zhyr of his parliamentary seat. They seemed to succeed 
initially, although the Ukrainian Supreme Court several days ago upheld Zhyr's 
complaints of irregular voting activity and invalidated the victory of his opponent. 
Votes in several constituencies will now be recounted. 
 
The president also continues to suggest that Melnychenko's tapes have been 
altered to implicate him unfairly. But he has yet to provide any evidence that the 
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tapes have been modified. Additionally, several other officials have authenticated 
their own (much more benign) recorded conversations with Kuchma. 
 
Unfortunately, authentication of the alleged Iraq conversation will not be possible. 
Days after Zhyr announced plans to bring the issue before parliament, Valeriy 
Malev, the director of the Ukrspecexport company and the man reportedly heard 
on the tape planning the arms deal with Kuchma, was killed in a car crash. 
Originally, authorities blamed Malev for the crash, but eventually suggested that 
it may not have been his fault. Regardless, Malev is conveniently dead, a point 
Zhyr loudly proclaimed in Ukraine. "Just days before Malev's death, the president 
was informed that the commission, including its chairman, had documents 
concerning the president's conversation with Malev on arms exports to Iraq. The 
president knew that I would not conceal this information," he said. (INTERFAX, 
13 Mar 02; via lexis-nexis) Zhyr also undoubtedly made plans to begin using 
public transportation. 
 
Whether Malev's death was simply a strange coincidence likely never will be 
determined, of course. But US officials seem intent on discovering the truth about 
Kuchma's possible involvement in illegal arms dealing. What they will do with the 
information is the question. If the Kolchuga case is proven, some type of 
sanctions could be implemented. This is always a possibility, and one that should 
concern Ukraine. But it is likely that US officials will want to keep the issue as 
quiet as possible, especially following the success of reformers in the recent 
election. Why agitate for reform when reform seems to be happening on its own? 
More likely, Kuchma's international pariah status will be underscored, the 
situation will be used domestically by his opponents, and Western officials will sit 
back and wait for the next presidential election. The outcome of that election will 
then dictate whether these latest allegations will become part of history or be 
resurrected for further investigation. 
 
MOLDOVA 
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Slow degeneration into violence 
It has taken months, but it seems that violence finally has become a regular 
feature of the conflict between Moldova's government and its determined and 
surprisingly resilient opposition. In the last several weeks, we have seen the 
disappearance of the country's most respected opposition leader, arson at the 
opposition headquarters, a possible attempted abduction of another opposition 
leader, the bombing of the Communist Party newspaper offices, and a near riot 
between opposition and government-supporting protestors. But at least the 
activity is keeping government officials busy; they certainly haven't been 
spending much time implementing legislation, economic policies or social plans. 
In fact, it seems that all governing has now ceased in the country, leaving its 
people to muddle-through on their own. 
 
What officials have been doing lately is attempting to convince the Council of 
Europe's rapporters for Moldova that everything is the opposition's fault. Take, for 
example, the disappearance of the deputy head of the Christian Democratic 
People's Party (CDPP), which is the organizer of opposition demonstrations. Vlad 
Cubreacov was on the front lines of several human rights issues in Moldova. He 
was the highest ranking lay member of the Bessarabian Metropolitan Church 
(Romanian Patriarchate), speaking out against Moldovan attempts to thwart the 
church's registration. He represented Moldova in the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe (PACE), spoke out against the government's attempts to 
clamp down on the media, vigorously opposed russification, and loudly protested 
against the recent plan to introduce compulsory Russian-language instruction in 
schools. 
 
Most importantly, Cubreacov's Western education and depth of experience made 
him Moldova's most respected player on the international scene, and he used 
that respect to further his opposition agenda. He was much more successful than 
the government would have liked. His representation of the Bessarabian 
Metropolitan Church (Romanian Patriarchate) at the CE European Court of 
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Human Rights led to an order that the church be registered. When the 
government tried to outlaw his party, the CE came down squarely on his side. His 
encouragement of journalists to protest their treatment before the CE Board for 
Mass Media was undoubtedly another irritant, particularly to a government that 
no longer has many options for international cooperation. And on the day before 
his disappearance, Cubreacov had found another cause -- what he called the 
"groundless" expulsion of Romanian diplomat Ion Ungureanu. Cubreacov was 
quoted extensively on the issue on non-state-owned television. (PROTV, 20 Mar 
02; BBC Monitoring, via lexis-nexis)  
 
Now, however, Cubreacov is missing, and it is highly unlikely that he will return. 
But, don't blame the Communists in power, authorities cautioned. The case is a 
"provocation" aimed at "destroying the government's image," Viktor Stepanok, 
the leader of the Communist faction in parliament, explained. (GLOBAL NEWS 
WIRE, 27 Mar 02; via lexis-nexis) Surprisingly, the CE does not seem impressed. 
Two representatives of the body recently finished a fact-finding mission in 
Moldova, and are expected to suggest that PACE pass a tough resolution about 
the situation. In fact, Moldova will be at the top of the agenda at a PACE meeting 
on 24 April, when the assembly will discuss "the functioning of democratic 
institutions in Moldova." (DRAFT ORDER OF BUSINESS, PACE, 25 Mar 02) 
 
Seemingly not satisfied that its reputation is damaged enough, the government 
also attempted to accuse CDPP leader Iuri Rosca and Cubreacov's replacement, 
Valentin Chilat, of attacking a group of policemen. Unfortunately for the 
government, after journalists interviewed a number of witnesses, it became clear 
that plain-clothed security officers had attempted to force Chilat into a car after 
assaulting him. Rosca, along with several bystanders, was able to intervene and 
the officers fled. (AP FLUX, 6 Apr 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database)  
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Around the same time, the headquarters of the CDPP was victimized by arson 
and, undoubtedly in retaliation, the Communist Party newspaper office was 
bombed. Luckily, no serious injuries resulted from either event. 
 
The Communists now appear to be attempting to counter the CDPP 
demonstrations -- still attracting anywhere from hundreds to thousands of 
protestors every day -- with demonstrations of their own. So far, they have had 
limited success.  
 
So, with all of this activity, the government of Moldova has stagnated, while 
citizens living away from the protests and rhetoric simply try to survive. It is 
probable that the country will default on its foreign debt shortly, and survival will 
become even more difficult. "When there's something to eat, I call our son to the 
table, and when there isn't, I don't, " Tatjana Zoti recently told the Associated 
Press. "Rare are the times when we feel we have eaten enough." (ASSOCIATED 
PRESS, 0331 EST, 15 Apr 02; via lexis-nexis) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
GEORGIA 
Ivanov's adventurism in Kodori 
Whatever doubts may have persisted about Russia's sponsorship of the Abkhaz 
rebel regime were dispelled last week when Russian "peacekeepers" staged an 
incursion into Georgian territory in the Kodori Gorge on 11 April. After UN and 
Georgian politicians reacted with outrage and indignation, the Russian force 
withdrew on 14 April claiming that its sole purpose was to set up a checkpoint. It 
seems more likely that the maneuver was a test of Georgia's (and its allies') 
ability and determination to defend against a new offensive. The incursion was 
clearly coordinated with the separatists, who threatened to stage a new 
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offensive. (PRIME-NEWS, 1315 GMT, 16 Apr 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Signaling that last week's incursion is just the beginning of a new Russian 
offensive, an unrepentant Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov told reporters on 15 
April that "our peacekeepers will continue in the future to patrol, control and 
monitor what takes place in the conflict zone as a whole and in the Kodori Gorge 
in particular." (RUSSIA TV, 15 Apr 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) On the following day, Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze told 
Moscow's REN TV that Ivanov is the main culprit behind the crisis. 
Shevardnadze also expressed doubt that Ivanov would be punished for his role 
in the affair. (REN TV, 0900 GMT, 16 Apr 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) 
 
Similarly, Georgia's popular television station, Rustavi-2, suggested that the 
Russian force (which actually had come from Gadauta, not Sukhumi), had 
ambitious plans. "The withdrawal of up to 80 soldiers who had arrived in Kodori 
without permission, and nearly five tons of ammunition started in the evening. 
Four helicopters had to make a total of 16 flights to complete the withdrawal. The 
Georgian military were saying openly today that, given how the Russians were 
armed, their goal was not merely to set up an observation post." The same 
station reported that, in addition to Georgian parliament deputies who flew to the 
scene, "during its entire stay, the Russian platoon was being watched by almost 
1,500 armed Georgians." Georgia's politicians and security service passed the 
test and succeeded in preventing an escalation. (RUSTAVI-2, 14 Apr 02; BBC, 
via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Georgian military went on alert last week, bringing the two countries to the brink 
of war, when Russian "peacekeepers" from Abkhazia staged an incursion into 
the Kodori Gorge. The Russian force, estimated in size from 78 to 200 persons, 
arrived by helicopter, with fighter plane escort, and set up camps in two locations 
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in the gorge. As ITAR-TASS phrased it, the outing was a "productive mission" 
because it proved that Georgian and Chechen militants are in the gorge. (ITAR-
TASS, 15 April 02; via ISI Emerging Markets Database) 
 
Try as they might, the Russian and Abkhaz representatives can't legitimize their 
incursion by referring to the presence of armed Georgians. First of all their 
presence does not contradict the agreement concluded with UN mediation on 2 
April. Gia Baramidze, a member of the Georgian parliament's Committee for 
Defense and Security, explained that "Units of the Georgian Defense Ministry 
have been withdrawn from here [Kodori]. No one has prohibited the keeping here 
of [Georgian] border guards and internal troops. Thus, armed people will 
naturally remain here, but not the units of the Defense Ministry." (RUSSIAN 
PUBLIC TV (ORT), 1700 GMT, 13 Apr 02; BBC, via ISI Emerging Markets 
Database) 
 
Moreover, the incursion demonstrates that stability can be achieved only if the 
Georgian military and security services continue to prevent such provocations 
from escalating. The Georgian military moved into the gorge in October 2001 
after a group of irregulars, rumored to include Ruslan Gelaev and other Chechen 
fighters, staged an attack against Abkhazia. The presence of the Georgian forces 
stabilized the situation, which became aggravated again only after the Georgian 
regular military was removed on 10 April, leaving only border guards in the 
gorge. (PRIME-NEWS, 1045 GMT, 10 Apr 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) 
 
The whole incident is deeply reminiscent of the 1992-1993 war, when Russian 
special forces fought on the side of the Abkhaz rebel minority which ethnically 
cleansed the majority ethnic Georgians from the region. Hence it outraged 
Georgian public opinion already deeply wounded by 10 years of Russian-
sponsored separatist conflict. In the days following the Russian incursion, the 
Georgian parliament renewed its calls for a removal of the Russian 
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"peacekeepers" and suspended discussion of a treaty on relations with Russia. 
(RUSTAVI-2 TV, 1300 GMT, 12 Apr 02; BBC Monitoring, via ISI Emerging 
Markets Database) 
 
For his part, President Eduard Shevardnadze flew to Kodori and spoke to 
President Putin on 13 April, urging him to pull back the troops and threatening to 
terminate the Russian peacekeepers' mission in Abkhazia if they did not return to 
their original positions. (KAVKASIA-PRESS, 0935 GMT, 13 Apr 02; BBC, via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) 
 
On 12 April the Chief UN Military Observer, Major General Anis A. Bajwa, 
expressed concern about the Russian incursion:  
 
"I have been informed by Georgian authorities that this morning six Russian 
helicopters landed about 80 troops in the Adjara village in the Upper Kodori 
Valley and that those troops began to build fortifications while two MI 24 gunship 
helicopters continuously provided air cover. Later, on inquiring it was confirmed 
by CIS PKF [peacekeeping force] that they had undertaken this operation in 
order to establish a Check Point in Adjara. 
 
"In earlier discussions I had advised the Commander of the CIS PKF, Maj. Gen 
Evteev to seek agreement of all the concerned parties for the re-establishment of 
such a Check Point,. [in particular, Georgian Defense Minister] Lt. Gen. David 
Tevzadze. 
 
"It is to my total surprise, therefore, that the CIS PKF decided to undertake the 
establishment of this Check Point immediately in an aggressive and combative 
manner, which is against the norms of peacekeeping. Deeply concerned about 
the effect of such operation on the UN-led Peace Process, and opposed to the 
manner in which this action has been conducted, I strongly urge the leadership of 
CIS PKF to immediately withdraw and act only in a manner mutually agreed and 
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acceptable to all parties. I emphasize on them the importance of resolving this 
new situation peacefully, preventing any degradation of the security situation and 
any harm to the peace process."(UN PRESS STATEMENT, 12 Apr 02; via 
www.civil.ge) 
 
In addition, on 14 April Putin spoke to US President George Bush about a whole 
spectrum of issues in US-Russian relations ranging from arms control to 
cooperation in resolving regional crises. It's not clear whether the crisis in Kodori 
Gorge was explicitly mentioned. (ORT, 12 Apr 02; What the Papers Say, via ISI 
Emerging Markets Database) 
 
The timing of the new escalation comes just as the US is about to deploy its train 
and equip mission to Georgia and raises concerns that Russia is punishing 
Georgia for seeking military cooperation with the US. As reported in the previous 
issue of the NIS Observed (3 Apr 02) the Russian government intimated that it 
would use the US deployment as an excuse to delay further the withdrawal of its 
bases from Georgia. The new escalation in the Kodori Gorge can be interpreted 
as another tactic to delay the US deployment. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Michael Donahue 
 
The changing face of Central Asia 
Since the American "war on terrorism" began more than seven months ago, 
much has changed in Central Asia -- mostly for the better. Increased foreign 
investment and humanitarian aid, renewed diplomatic ties to the West, and more-
detailed coverage of the plight of the region's peoples have created the 
conditions for a more prosperous future for the area. A great deal of "credit" must 
go to Osama bin Laden and his patron Taliban government in Afghanistan, 
without which the United States never would have become involved in the region. 
 31 
It is largely through the American-led coalition that progress toward democratic 
governance and more civil societies has been made. 
 
Less than a year ago, political opposition in Central Asia was both scarce and 
dangerous. Indeed, in Uzbekistan alone political opponents were either in prison, 
in exile, or in hiding until recently. However, President Islam Karimov, who was 
roundly criticized for his government's human rights abuses (including controlling 
the press and oppressing political opposition) as recently as his visit last month 
to Washington, seemingly has softened his hard line. In a press conference last 
week, President Karimov officially welcomed exiled political opponents, provided 
they had not previously engaged in terrorist activities. (EURASIA INSIGHT, 13 
Apr 02; via Eurasianet) While such a restriction on the return of exiles to 
Uzbekistan is understandable on the surface, given the fact that Karimov has 
employed a very loose definition of terrorism since 11 September, it may amount 
to no exiles being allowed back into the country. However, even if a limited 
number of exiles is allowed to return and they can engage Karimov in substantive 
and open debate on political differences, will this be enough to generate 
adequate Western enthusiasm for the prospects of true democracy in 
Uzbekistan? Unfortunately the answer may be no, because a number of other 
positive steps that the Uzbek government has made recently have gone largely 
unnoticed in the West. 
 
In Turkmenistan President Saparmurat "Turkmenbashi" Niyazov had ruled 
almost entirely unopposed for years, with opposition groups marginalized by 
strict control of the press and political subjugation. As a result of the "war on 
terrorism" and the hundred-fold increase of reporters and international attention 
to the region, however, the opposition has been emboldened and armed with 
significant firepower. 
 
Boris Shikhmuradov, the leader of the Turkmen opposition, recently received 
major international support in light of the accusations that President Niyazov has 
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been involved heavily in the heroin trade. Shikhmuradov has good reason to feel 
upbeat about his chances for success in Turkmenistan: Niyazov's cult of 
personality has been fading as of late and he has provided very limited 
assistance in the coalition war effort. (EURASIA INSIGHT, 15 Mar 02; via 
Eurasianet) With the neighboring Taliban government ousted and the war 
seemingly winding down in Afghanistan, the United States and its coalition 
partners may be more willing to support what once would have been considered 
as too destabilizing in the fragile region -- the toppling of the Turkmen 
government and the establishment of a true democracy. Certainly a pro-Western 
democracy under Shikhmuradov with the energy resources that Turkmenistan 
claims would be better received than an ambivalent dictatorship under a 
druglord. While regime change in Turkmenistan is far from a certainty, it is much 
closer today than it was on 10 September. 
 
The obvious losers to date in the "war on terrorism" are indisputably al Qaeda 
and the Taliban government. The not-so-obvious losers, however, have to be the 
established governments in Central Asia, as increased aid and international 
attention have strengthened opposition groups and destabilized authoritarian 
regimes. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Michael Varuolo 
 
LITHUANIA 
Neighbors can be difficult 
For the Republic of Lithuania, dealing with a neighbor that is sometimes 
unfriendly is a daily chore. Those who believe Russia might be Lithuania's most 
unfriendly neighbor might want to consider its other "favorite" neighbor -- Belarus. 
Since regaining independence, the two countries have traveled in markedly 
different directions. Lithuania is trying to distance itself from Russia as it attempts 
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to join both the European Union and NATO, while Belarus has moved closer to 
Russia in an effort to rejoin with its former imperial master in a union. 
 
Lithuanian-Russian disagreements focus on very tangible issues, such as the 
cross-border movements of Russian forces to the enclave of Kaliningrad. Belarus 
poses quite a different challenge to the Lithuanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, due 
to the frequency with which the two neighbors are at odds. Disagreements have 
been common in the last several years, but this past April has seen a dramatic 
upturn in the number of difficulties between the two countries. 
 
The first problem developed on 3 April when Belarusian customs authorities 
raised the issue of truck transportation violations. Despite a negotiated 
comprehensive agreement on International Road Transport System (TIR) 
regulations, the Belarusian customs office has tightened border-crossing 
procedures and handed the government of Lithuania a bill for millions of dollars 
worth of fines. (BNS, 0907 GMT, 3 Apr 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0403; via World 
News Connection) The conflict over transit agreements could affect both 
economies, since Belarus represents Lithuania's fourth largest trading partner. 
 
Then, Lithuanian media stepped up their campaign on behalf of several 
Belarusian journalists being tried in Minsk. The journalists, from the Hrodna-
based newspaper Pahonya, are charged with defaming the president in articles 
written prior to the September 2001 presidential elections. (BBC, 11 Apr 02; via 
lexis-nexis) Their case, like many others in Belarus, has been followed closely by 
the Lithuanian Journalists' Union. Through a statement to the Belarusian 
Embassy in Vilnius, the journalists have condemned Belarusian President 
Alyaksandr Lukashenka's continued restrictions on freedom of the press. (BNS, 
1250 GMT, 9 Apr 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0409; via World News Connection) 
 
For every action there appears to be an opposite reaction, and in this case the 
reaction came in the form of official complaints from the government of Belarus to 
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Lithuania. The complaint alleges that Lithuania maintains a policy towards 
Belarus that is not only inconsistent but also not independent. (BNS, 1432 GMT, 
11 Apr 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0411, via World News Connection) The spokesmen 
from the Belarusian Foreign Affairs Ministry, Pavel Latushka, did not elaborate 
upon the charges. Apparently perplexed by the accusations, Lithuania again 
asserted its position of patiently waiting for democracy and human rights to 
prosper in Belarus while continuing to propose initiatives for cooperation. (BNS, 
1432 GMT, 11 Apr 02; FBIS-SOV-2002-0411, via World News Connection) 
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